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INTRODUCTION

I.

For years, universal service has meant affordable telephone service for all United States residences, regardless of geographic location.' This
goal was achieved through a series of subsidization mechanisms imposed upon telephone companies by state and federal regulators. 2 In a recent ruling, the Federal Communications
Commission, in conjuntion with a federal-state
joint board, developed a variation on traditional
universal service concepts: because the Internet
has become such an extraordinary modern tool,
all schools, libraries and rural health care providers should have access to the Internet at subsidized rates.3 On the surface, the plan appears
1

Telephone penetration in the United States has been a

phenomenal success story with overall penetration at 94 percent. See Monitoring Report, CC Dkt. No. 87-339, at 14 (rel.
May 1997); see also Nichole L. Millard, Universal Service, Section
254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Hidden Tax?, 50
FED. COMM. L.J. 255, 256 (1997).
See Livia. Slonage West, Deregulating Telecommunications:
2
The Conflict Between Competition and Universal Service, 9 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 159, 167 (1996) (explaining that the FCC brought
local telephone rates to a reasonable level by implementing a
complex system of subsidy flows in which long distance rates
subsidized local rates, business rates subsidized residential
rates, and urban rates subsidized rural rates).
3 The Commission found that all eligible schools and libraries should receive discounts of between twenty percent
and ninety percent below retail on all telecommunications
services, Internet access, and internal connections provided
by telecommunications carriers, subject to a $2.25 billion annual cap. See In re Federal-State joint Board on Universal Service, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 9002 para. 425
(1997) (hereinafter Universal Service Order].
4 See id.; see also Barbara Ford, Internet:Access for All, WASH.
POST, Jan. 9, 1998, at A20 (extolling the virtues of universal
service).
5
See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 9002 para.
425, 9015 para. 449. The federal Universal Service Fund for
schools and libraries was designed to bring these institutions
advanced telecommunications services, such as access to the

Internet. See Mike Mills, D.C. Schools Seek Internet Funding,

quite simple. Internet service providers ("ISPs")
will offer Internet access to schools, libraries and
rural health care providers at prices well below retail. 4 The ISPs will be compensated for these discounts through a universal service fund ("USF").5
The USF, in turn, will be supported by telecommunications carriers such as long distance phone
companies.

6

However, some of the major telecommunications carriers believe they have a better idea. 7 Alternatively, they argue that providers of enhanced
services, such as ISPs, should not be supported by
the universal service fund, despite the FCC's good
intentions." Instead, they assert that ISPs, because
they compete to some extent with traditional teleWASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1998, at DI. Subject to a $2.25 billion

cap, schools and libraries nationwide can purchase subsidized telecommunications services and inside wiring from 10
percent to 90 percent of the actual cost. See id. The degree
of the discount depends upon how many children participate
in the federal school lunch program. See id. The USF is paid
for by telecommunications carriers, primarily long distance
providers, and administered by the School's and Libraries
Corp., established by the FCC. See id. But see, John Simmons,
Internet-Hookup Group Draws PoliticalFire, Wall St. J., Mar. 20,
1998, at A16. The General Accounting Office rececently concluded that the FCC exceeded its authority in establishing
the Schools and Libraries Corp. See id. SenatorJohn McCain
plans to hold hearings to consider terminating the new
quasiprivate corporation. See id.
6 "All providers of telecommunications services should
make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to
the preservation and advancement of universal service." The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(b) (4) (Supp. 1997)).
7
See Reply Comments of AT&T Corp., In re Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service (Report to Congress), CC
Dkt. No. 96-45, at 9 (Feb. 6, 1998) [hereinafter AT&T Reply
Comments]; see also Comments of Airtouch Communications,
Inc., In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service (Report to Congress), CC Dkt. No. 96-45 (Jan. 26, 1998) [hereinafter Airtouch Comments] (arguing that the universal service
fund should be supported through general tax revenues).
8 See Comments of SBC Communications Inc., In re Fed-
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communications carriers, should have to make
contributions to the universal service fund.9
To many traditional telecommunications carriers, the idea of subsidizing ISPs is not particularly
appealing."' They contend that it violates the procompetitive precepts of the 1996 Act ("1996 Act")
to force one group of market players to support
another.1 ' They argue that the relevant provisions of the 1996 Act do not give the FCC carte
blanche to play regulatory Robin Hood with their
universal service contributions.1 2 After all, ISPs
offer a telecommunications-like service that could
pose serious competition to traditional telecommunications providers in the near future. 1 3 In
fairness, shouldn't they too have to bear the bur14
den of universal service.
At the center of this debate is Section 254 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.15 Congress directly addressed the goals of universal service for
the first time in the 1996 Act.1 6 What was merely

dilemma is exacerbated by the Commission's insistence on applying outmoded terminology, instituted under a monopolistic environment, to a
new regulatory context driven by the goal of expanding competition in a post local-monopoly
world. 2' Essentially, the question is one of statutory interpretation. As stated, the FCC has set
forth its take on Section 254 in its Universal Service
Order, but it is doubtful that the Commission will
22
have the last word.

eral-State Joint Board on Universal Service (Report to Congress), CC Dkt. No. 96-45, at 1 (Jan. 30, 1998) [hereinafter
SBC Comments]; see also Reply Comments of GTE Service
Corp., In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service
(Report to Congress), CC Dkt. No. 96-45, at 19 (Feb. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter GTE Reply Comments].
9 See AT&T Reply Comments, supra note 7, at 11 (asserting
that ISPs pose real competition to providers of long distance
service, especially in the areas of real-time fax and voice
transmissions).
10 The 1996 act states that only "telecommunications carrier(s)" will support universal service. 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(d) (Supp. 1997); see generally Catherine Yang, Telecom:
Congress Should Reform its Reform, Bus. Wk, Jan. 12, 1998, at 40.
I
See AT&T Reply Comments, supra note 7, at ii-iii.
12
See id.
11 Soon, businesses like Qwest Communications Corp.
will make serious grabs at long distance market share by offering Internet-based calling to U.S. customers. See Steven V.
Brull, At Seven And A Half Cents A Minute, Who Cares If You
Can't Hear A Pin Drop?, Bus. WK, Dec. 29, 1997, at 46. This
idea has come even closer to fruition with Qwest Corp.'s proposed merger with LCI. See Mike Mills, LCI to be Acquired in
$4.4 billion Deal, WAsh. POST, March 10, 1998, at CI.
14
See Airtouch Comments, supra note 7, at 27 (arguing that
ISPs should have to contribute to the USF); But cf Comments of America Online, Inc., In re Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service (Report to Congress), CC. Dkt.
No. 96-45, at 21 (Jan. 26, 1998) [hereinafter AOL Comments]
(contending that the 1996 Act does not allow the Commission to require ISPs to contribute to the USF).
15 47 U.S.C. § 254 (Supp. 1997).
16 Section 254 of the 1996 Act is thus appropriately entitled, "Universal Service." Id.
17 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp.
1997)).
18 See id; see also Reply Comments of The Education and
Library Networks Coalition, In re Federal-State Joint Board
On Universal Service (Report to Congress), CC Dkt. No. 96-

45, at 1-2 (Feb. 6, 1998) [hereinafter EDLINC Reply Comments].
19 See Mike Mills, FloridaSeeks HigherPhone Rates to Expand
Market, WASH. PosT, March 8, 1998, at A8 (reporting that
state and federal regulators are "puzzling" over universal service).
20
Senators Burns and Stevens warn: "Although some
members of industry may support the Commission's approach in a shortsighted effort to obtain relief from access
charges and other outdated regulatory structures, they are
likely to be disappointed with the long-term result." Comments of Senators Burns and Stevens, In re Federal-State joint
Board on Universal Service (Report to Congress), CC Dkt.
No. 96-45, at 5 (Jan. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Burns and Stevens
Comments].
21
Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 8. In expressing their disagreements with the FCC's implementation
of Section 254, the Senators state, "Our greatest concern is
that the Commission continues to apply concepts developed
in an inflexible monopoly environment to the flexible, postlocal-monopoly world that the Telecommunications Act was
intended to create." Id.
22
Less than six weeks after the FCC released its Universal
Service Order, SBC Communications, Inc. filed suit in the
Eighth Circuit requesting that the court "hold unlawful, vacate, enjoin, and set aside" the Commission's Order, or at
least stay those portions that provide federal support to
schools and libraries for Internet access... and other nontelecommunications providers. See SBC Asks FCC to Stay Universal Service Order, COMM. TODAY, July 18, 1997, at 14. On
March 9, 1998, America's Carriers Telecommunication Association (ACTA) asked a district court in the Fifth Circuit to
hold the FCC's Universal Service Order unconstitutional in its
entirety. ACTA contends that if Congress wants to raise
funds for universal service purposes, it must do so by creating
an explicit.new tax, a power outside of the scope of the Commission's authority. See ACTA Challenges Constitutionality of
Universal Service (visited Mar. 12, 1998) <http://
www.prnewswire.com:80/cgi-bin/sto. . .04&STORY=/www/
story/ 3-9-98/431149&EDATE=>.

implicit in the Communications Act of 1934
("1934 Act"), 17 is now laid out in the form of general framework through which the FCC and state
regulatory commissions are to achieve the goals of
universal service.'
Both regulatory bodies are
struggling to devise a system that comports with
the 1996 Act.19 The language of the universal service provision of the 1996 Act lends itself to contradictory interpretations that can be rationalized
to support one's particular market biases. 20 The
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The Controversy

A.

The battle lines have been drawn. ISPs are
thrilled with the FCC's interpretation of Section
254.23 They undoubtedly look forward to receiving universal service support and expanding their
market base at the expense of traditional telecommunications carriers. 24 indeed, they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. 25 Many tradi-

tional telecommunications providers, on the
other hand, are incensed by the FCC's proposed
scheme. 2 6 Never before have the beneficiaries of

universal service been anything but the providers
of plain old telephone service ("POTS").27 They
assert that ISPs, who do not fit under the FCC's
definition of "telecommunications carrier" and
who offer a competitive alternative to traditional
telecommunications services, should have to contribute their fair share to the universal service
fund in the spirit of competitive neutrality, one of
28
the central goals of the 1996 Act.

Part I of this note will provide a brief background on universal service and trace the dramatic evolution of this social policy to its present
state. Part II illuminates the regulatory definitions the Commission has chosen to apply to Section 254. Part III discusses Section 254 and the
FCC's plan to implement this section in its UniverSee AOL Comments, supra note 14, at 18.
See, e.g., Kelley Holland, Phone Subsidies Get An Overhaul, Bus. WK., May 19, 1997, at 46; see also Yang, supra note
10.
25 Again, this is due to the fact that, under the FCC's
plan, Internet access will be subsidized by the USF, but ISPs
will not have to contribute to the USF. See AOL Comments,
supra note 14, at 21; see also Universal Service Order, 12 FCC
Rcd. at 9179 para. 788.
26 Roxana E. Cook, All Wired Up: An Analysis of the FCC's
Orderto Internally Connect Schools, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 215, 217
(Dec. 1997) (citing that critics have, "denounced the subsidy
as unsupported by the Act's language and outside the FCC's
authority").
Before the passage of the 1996 Act, only long distance carriers supported universal service. As of January 1998, the federal USF will be supported by all interstate telecommunications carriers, including long distance companies, local
telephone companies, cellular telephone companies, paging
companies, and pay-phone service providers. SeeConsumer Information: The FCC's Universal Service Support Mechanisms, (visited Mar. 18, 1998) <Fact Sheet: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common Carrier/Factsheets/univers.html>.
27
Doug Abrahms, AT&T Seeks Lower Fee to Reach Customers, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at B6 (quoting Rep. W.J.
"Billy" Tauzin stating: "What I'm suggesting is keeping the
universal service fund for what it is supposed to do- provide
universal phone service").
28
See GTE Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 21 (arguing
that the Commission must find a more equitable approach in
23

24

sal Service Order.29 Part IV sets forth the statutory
arguments both for and against the FCC's universal service plan as it effects ISPs. Finally, part V
contends there are only two acceptable interpretations of Section 254. The first option applies old
regulatory terminology developed over decades of
regulation, the result being that ISPs can neither
take from, nor contribute to, the universal service
fund. The second option incorporates a more up
to date interpretation that sheds certain regulatory distinctions that have become irrelevant.
Under this application, ISPs could benefit from
the USF, but they would also be required to contribute to the USF in the same manner as other
telecommunications carriers.3 '
II.

AN EVOLVING DEFINITION OF
UNIVERSAL SERVICE

The concept of universal service has come a
long way since the term was coined in 1907 by
Theodore Vail, then president of AT&T. 3 1 In
Vail's time, universal service meant interconnectivity. 32 The essential goal was that no matter

what telephone company to which one subscribed, all subscribers of all companies would be
able to talk to one another. 33 This definition of
order for the universal service mechanism to be competitively neutral).
29
See generally Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at
8776.
This paper does not analyze whether subsidized In30
ternet access for schools and libraries is sound policy.
Rather, It distills the only two acceptable interpretations of
Section 254, neither of which has been adopted by the Commission. However, for an illuminating discussion of this
topic, see generallyWest, supra note 2. West contends that universal service subsidies are fundamentally incompatible in
what is supposed to be a competitive deregulatory regime
under the 1996 Act. Id.
31
See Richard E. Nohe, A Different Time, A Different Place:
Breaking Up Telephone Companies in the United States and Japan,
48 FED. COMM. L.J. 307, 309 n.12 (1996).
32
See Milton Mueller, Telecommunications Access In The Age

of Electronic Commerce: Toward A Third-Generation of Universal
Service Policy, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 655, 656 (1997).
33
During Vail's time many local exchange markets had
several carriers that offered basic telephone service. See
Milton L. Mueller, Jr., UNIXERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSrEM, 4-13 (1997). These carriers, however, could not interconnect with one another. See id. A
subscriber to phone company A, could not pick up the
phone and call a subscriber to phone company B. See id.

Consequently, many businesses owned not just one, but several phones, and several phone company subscriptions. See
id. Many, especially proponents of AT&T, argued that this
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universal service lasted from 1907 to about 1965; a
period some refer to as the "first generation" of
34
universal service.
A second generation of universal service policy
emerged around the same time the Bell monopoly began to feel the threat of competition in the
long distance market.3 5 From 1965-1996, 36 during
the second generation, the concept of universal
service grew to mean telephone service in every
home at reasonable charges, regardless of geographic location.37 Telephone service was considered an essential need, a utility, much like water
or electric power service.38 Universal service thus
became social policy, a state of affairs that thrived
under the Bell monopoly, and which survives to
this day.3 9
Regulators during the second generation
thought that the market alone could not ensure
that the goals of second generation universal service policy would be achieved.4 0 Providing telecommunications services to sparsely populated rural areas was simply not profitable. 4 1 Even if a
was economic waste; that telecommunications services should
be provided in ubiquitous form by one regulated utility so
that all subscribers would be interconnected. See id. This led
to the Communications Act of 1934 under which AT&T submitted to regulatory oversight in return for a government
sanctioned monopoly over the majority of the nation's telecommunications market. See id.
34
Mueller traces the evolution of universal service in
three steps. See Mueller, supra note 32, at 657-68. The first
generation encompasses the period of 1907-1965. See id.
This era began with widespread competition among phone
companies and ended with a deeply entrenched Bell monopoly tinder the Communications Act of 1934. See id. The second generation (1965-1996) takes place amidst the slow chipping away of the Bell monopoly with the introduction of
competition in long distance markets, the 1984 divestiture of
the Bell system, and the regulation of the nation's telecommunications market under Judge Harold Greene's Consent
Decree. See id. The third generation of Universal service represents what is to come under the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. Id. Mueller contends that regulators incorrectly assumed the paradigms of second generation universal service
(a uniform grade of service, reaching all homes at reasonable
rates) could be successfully applied under the diverse and
rapidly expanding new regime. See id.
35
See id. at 657.
36
See id.
37
See West, supra note 2, at 165-66; see generally Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 9, et seq. (1994).
38
Evidently, this policy assumed that a significant
number of users could not afford to pay for monthly local
telephone service, especially in rural areas. See Mueller, supra
note 32, at 658.
39 See Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common CarriageSurvive The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L.
REv. 955, 956 (1997). Noam argues that universal service will
endure despite its inherent friction with the competitive der-
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local exchange carrier ("LEC") merely charged
enough to recover its cost of providing service in
rural regions, its rates still would have been economically prohibitive to most customers. 42 Other
telecommunications markets provided for better
oppotunities for a carrier. For example, a LEC
could profit far more by serving large concentrated business customers than by serving scattered residential customers. 43 The newly competitive long-distance market also proved to be
tremendously lucrative. 4 4 Consequently, in order

to meet the new universal service goals, regulators
manipulated rates through a series of subsidization mechanisms to ensure that the price of local
45
phone service would be comparable nationwide.
Regulators authorized carriers to raise prices far
above cost in the more profitable (low cost) areas
of the telecommunications market so prices in the
less profitable (high cost) markets could be kept
down. 46 As a result of the new universal service

policy, long-distance and business users subsi-

egulatory goals of the 1996 Act. Id. The longevity of universal service may have more to do with political dynamics than
economic principles. Id. at 961.
40
These supposed market deficiencies served to reinforce the legitimacy of the regulated Bell monopoly. See
Miles W. Hughes, Telecommunications Reform and the Death of
the Local Exchange Monopoly, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 179, 197
(1996).
41
In fact, prices based on actual costs are still economically prohibitive in most rural areas. See Comments of the
Beehive Telephone Companies, In re, Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service (Report to Congress), CC Dkt.
No. 96-45, at 2 Uan. 26, 1998) [hereinafter Beehive Comments].
For instance, the Beehive Telephone Co. requires a $97 per
month per subscriber universal service subsidy in order to
make basic telephone service affordable for its subscribers.
Id.
42 John N. Rose, Universal Phone Support: It's Still a Good
Idea, Bus WK, June 2, 1997, at 12. Mr. Rose points out that,
"there isn't a marketplace in the world that can overcome the
extreme costs of operating in iron-hard mountains or soupy
swamps-where the consumer population can be counted in
the single digits." Id.
43
Peter Knight, Recent Developments In Information Technology In the Asia-Pacific Region (PartI), 14 COMPUTER LAWYER 19,
27 (March 1997).
44 The Lure of Distance, ECONOMIST, April 6, 1996, at 63.
45 Much of this subsidization took place via lop-sided access charges that Interexchange carriers would pay to local
exchange carriers for the origination and termination of interstate calls, as well as rate averaging and high intrastate toll
rates. See Jamie N. Nafziger, Time to Pay Up: Internet Service
Providers' Universal Service Obligations Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37,
43 (1997).
46
See Mueller, supra note 32, at 658 (explaining that the
policy taxed usage in order to subsidize access).
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47
dized rural and residential users.

We are currently in the midst of the third generation of universal service policy. 48 This era began with the passing of the 1996 Act. 49 The basic

tenants of the previous regime remain. 50 Regulators and legislators are as concerned as ever with
ensuring that all people have access to telecommunications service at reasonable rates. 5 1 There
are, however, a few twists. First, universal service
is no longer an intangible overarching policy
goal. 52 Congress condoned the years of implicit

acteristic of third generation universal service policy is its glaring incompatibility with the competitive precepts of the Telecommunications Act. 59
The primary purpose of the Act was deregulation
and the introduction of competition to local telephone markets. 60

Meanwhile, the FCC is ex-

pected to keep the market in check through regulation to ensure affordable access to
telecommunications for all Americans. 61 This
only serves to fuel the current controversy over
62
third generation universal service policy.

subsidies by codifying universal sevice policy in its
very own section within the 1996 Act. 53

Second,

the Act demands that universal service goals no
54
longer be achieved via implicit cross-subsidies.
Under the new regime, the Act requires that universal service be funded through explicit contri55
butions that will go into a universal service fund.
Third, unlike second generation universal service
policy, there is no longer unanimity as to what
carriers should contribute to, and what carriers
56
should benefit from, the universal service fund.
Some would limit those beneficiaries to the prov57
iders of POTS as under the previous regime.
Others would extend universal service support to
providers of what the FCC calls enhanced services,
such as ISPs. 58 The final, and most striking char47
See Id.; See also James Freeman, Feds Hate the Web,
FORBES, Aug. 25, 1997, at S79 (stating that the general theory
behind universal service is that "the provision of some services is too important to be left to the whims of the marketplace"). Id; but see Amy Barrett, But do Aspen and Vail Really
Need Phone Subsidies?, Bus. WK., May 12, 1997, at 43 (arguing
that universal service subsidies commonly benefit those who
have no need for it).
48
The term "third generation universal service policy" is
a variation on Mueller's three-chapter approach to universal
service. The third generation embodies broader universal
service goals that Congress supposedly sought to reach in
Section 254 of the 1996 Act. See generally Mueller, supra note
32.
49 See id. at 658-59.
50
See id.
51
See generally Abrahms, supra note 27.
52 See Mueller, supra note 32, at 658.
53
See 47 U.S.C.A § 254 (1997 Supp.).
54
The 1996 Act demands that universal service support
mechanisms be specific and predictable. Id. at 254(d).
55
See H.R. Conf. Rep. 104458, at 131 (1996) reprinted in

1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 141-142; see also UniversalService Order,
12 FCC Rcd. at 9002 para. 425.
56
For instance, America Online ("AOL") claims that Internet access for schools and libraries should be subsidized
by the USF and that only telephone companies should have
to contribute to the Fund. See generally AOL Comments, supra
note 14. But see AT&T Reply Comments, supra note 7, at 11.
AT&T argues that Internet access should not be supported by

III.

DEFINING OUR TERMS: SECOND
GENERATION HOLDOVERS

Just as certain policies survived from second
generation universal service into the third, certain
terms were transplanted as well. 63 An understanding of how a few of these terms endured is critical
to an appreciation of the current controversy.
A.

The Basic/Enhanced Distinction

Under the second generation of universal service, telephone companies that held themselves
out as common carriers both supported and
benefitted from the overall mechanism. 64 During
the fund and that the providers of Internet access should
nevertheless have to make USF contributions because they
compete, to some extent, with phone companies. See id.
57
See Abrahms, supra note 27.
58
See Ford, supra note 4 (arguing that giving school children access to the Internet is a prerequisite to their being
able to stay afloat in the information age).
59 But see CHAiRmAN WILLIAM KENARD, FCC, ADDRESS TO
THE PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE (Dec. 11, 1997, Washington,
D.C.). "There have always been those who have said that you
can't have competition and universal service. That's simply
wrong. Quite to the contrary, we can have competition and
have universal service. And we will." Id.
60 See Alex J. Mandl, Telecom Competition is Coming Sooner
Than You Think, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 26, 1998, at A18 (criticizing
the delays in meeting the 1996 Act's objectives); see generally
Mills, supra note 13.
61
See West, supra note 2, at 159.
62
See Jim Chen, The Legal Process and PoliticalEconomy of
Telecommunications Reform, 97 COLUM. L. RiV. 835, 865 (1997)
(citing the inherent contradiction between deregulation and
universal service subsidization).
63
See generally Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20,
at 5-6 (criticizing the Commission for using an outdated definition of the term "telecommunications carrier").
64
See id. The Senators point out that the term "telecommunications carrier" which Congress employs in the 1996 Act
is derived from the term "common carrier" as set forth in the
NARUC II decision. See id. at 6. In NARUC II,the court defined a common carrier as a service provider which, "holds
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this period, universal service funds supported only
"basic services." 6 5 Under the FCC's interpreta-

tion, basic services constituted, "common carrier
offering(s) of transmission capacity for the movement of information."66 This primarily encom67
passed plain old telephone service or POTS.
The FCC designated another class of services as
"enhanced services." 68 According to the regulatory definition, enhanced services combined basic
services with "computer processing applications
that act on the format, content, code, protocol, or
other similar aspects of the subscriber's information."6 9 Internet transmissions can involve both

7
computer processing and protocol conversion. 11

Consequently, under the FCC's definition of enhanced service, an ISP would be considered an
enhanced service provider, and thus Internet ac71
cess would constitute an enhanced service.

tinction crept into third generation universal service policy. 72 The Commission has substituted the
terms "basic" and "enhanced" with "telecommunications" and "information," respectively.73, It appears that basic service, under the old regime, is
now considered telecommunications service, and
much of what was previously considered enhanced service is now information service.7 4 An
example of a telecommunications service under
the FCC's current scheme would be POTS. 75 Ac-

cordingly, the provider of this service is classified
as a "telecommunications carrier.

'76

In contrast,

an example of an information service under the
third generation regime would be Internet access. 77 The provider of Internet access, therefore,
is an ISP.78 Whether the FCC's decision to distinguish between Internet services and telecommunications services is appropriate will be addressed
later.79 For now, it is important to recognize that
the Commission distinguishes between the two.8 °

B.

The Telecommunications/Information
Distinction
This second generation basic/enhanced dis-

itself out indifferently to serve to all potential users," and allows those users to, "transmit intelligence of their own design
and choosing." National Ass'n. of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ("NARUC") v. FCC, 553 F.2d 601, 608-09 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
65
See In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77
F.C.C. 2d 384, 387 at para. 5 (1980), modified, 84 F.C.C. 2d 50
(1980), further modified on reconsideration, 88 F.C.C. 2d 512
(1981) [hereinafter Computer J1].
66

Id.

See id. at 418 para. 90.
See 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (1997). The rule states in relevant part: "the term enhanced services shall refer to services,
offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in
interstate communications, which employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information." Id.
69 Id.; see also ComputerI, 77 F.C.C. 2d, at 498 app. 1 (a).
70
See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 9321 app. I.
71
See id.
72
See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 5 (noting that, "The Commission's continued classification of services as 'enhanced' or 'basic' could seriously undermine the
competitive regime Congress sought to create").
73 See Id; see also Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy, OPP Working Paper No.
29, (visited Mar. 19, 1998) < http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
OPP/working-papers/oppwp29.txt> .
74 See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 8.
The Senators assert that Congress did not intend this to be
the case. Id.
67
68

75 See In re Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant
to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
Amended, To Provide In-Region, Interlata Services to Michigan, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 Com. Reg. (P&F) 267,
320 n. 433 (1997).
76
See 47 U.S.C. § 153 (44) (1994) (defining a telecommunications carrier as, "any provider of telecommunications
services").
77
The 1996 Act defines an information service as, "the
offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications..." 47 U.S.C.

§ 153 (20) (Supp. 1997).
78
See In re Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance
Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 21354, 21364 para. 19 (1996) (stating: "we also discuss possible changes to our existing treatment of the use by interstate information service providers,
such as Internet service provider") (emphasis added).
79
The author contends that this distinction is an unfortunate policy choice based on out-dated regulatory terminology.
80 See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 9178 para.
785, 9180 para. 789. The distinguishing factor between a
telecommunications service and an information service is
what is known as protocol conversion. Id. at para. 439. Protocol conversion is a functional capability of an information
service that allows for communication to take place between
disparate terminals or networks. See In re Petition for a Declaratory Ruling That AT&T's Frame Relay Service is a Basic
Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 13, 717
n.5 (1995).
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IV. SECTION 254 AND THE COMMISSION'S
UNIVERSAL SERVICE ORDER

Section 254(b) (6) is entitled: "Access to Advanced Telecommunications Services for Schools,

Congress means when it uses terms such as "advanced telecommunications services" and "additional services."8' 7 This, of course, would be all too
easy. Instead, one finds subsections (h) (1) (B)
and (h) (2) (A). 88 Subsection (h) (1) (b) informs
that, "All telecommunications carriers shall provide such services to elementary schools, secondary schools, and libraries for educational purposes at rates less than the amounts charged for
similar services to other parties."8' 9 In order to decipher what Congress meant by "such services,"
the reader is almost mockingly referred back to
subsection (c) (3), the provision that got them
there in the first place. 90
The subsection then goes on to say that any
telecommunications carrier that provides service
under (h)(1)(B) should either be reimbursed
through universal service mechanisms or have
their universal service contribution reduced accordingly.9 1 Unfortunately, however, (h) (1) (B)
makes no reference to Internet service providers,
or providers of advanced services. 9 2 It speaks only

Health Care, and Libraries."8 4

of telecommunications carriers .9 3 Again, accord-

A.

Section 254

Section 254 is the embodiment of third generation universal service policy. 81 It is also the battlefield for the current controversy over ISPs and the
USF. 82 Problems arise when determining exactly
what entities and what services Congress intended
would support the USF, and what entities and
83
services would be the beneficiaries of the USF.
This state of affairs is primarily due to the fact that
Section 254 is an almost cruel exercise in legislative doublespeak. Understanding this dilemma
requires a close and somewhat tedious look at
Section 254.
1. 254(b)(6) and 254(c)(3)

This provision

states that, "Elementary and secondary schools
and classrooms, health care providers, and libraries should have access to advanced telecommuni85
cations services as described in subsection (h)."
Similarly, subsection (c)(3) states that, "[T]he
Commission may designate additional services for
such support mechanisms for schools, libraries,
and health care providers for the purposes of subsec'8
tion (h)."

ing to the Commission's interpretation, ISPs are
considered to be enhanced service providers or
information service providers, not telecommunications carriers.9 4 Thus, subsection (h) (1) (B)'s
applicability to ISPs appears a bit tenuous under
the Commission's current classification of that
95
term.

6

3.
2. 254(h)(1)(B)
Proceeding dutifully to subsection (h) one
would expect to find some explanation of what

254(h)(2)(A)

It is much easier to find a place for ISPs in subsection (h) (2) (A), entitled, "Advanced Serv6

ices."9

This provision instructs the Commission

81

89

Id. at (h)(1)(B).

82

90

Id. at (c)(3).
Id. at (h)(1)
(B)(i),
(ii)

See Mueller, supra note 32, at 658.
See generally SBC Comments, supra note 8 (arguing that
Section 254 does not allow ISPs to receive federal universal

service support).

See Airtouch Comments, supra note 7, at 20. Airtouch
lays out the two issues of universal service policy design
rather concisely: "(a) Which consumers and carriers, and
which services, are eligible for support? and (b) Which con83

sumers and carriers have to bear the costs of universal service
programs?" Id.
84

47 U.S.C. § 254(b) (6) (Supp. 1997).

Id.
86 Id. at (c)(3).
85

87
Section 153, the provision that defines the terms used
in the Act, does not define either term. 47 U.S.C. § 153
(Supp. 1997).
88 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B), (h)(2)(A) (Supp. 1997).

91

Id.; see also SBC Comments, supra note 8,at 4.
See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (h)(1)(B) (Supp.1997).
94 See In re Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order,
12 FCC Rcd. 15982, 16165 para. 430 (1997); see also The FCC,
Internet Service Providers, and Access Charges (visited Feb. 19,
1998)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/
92
93

Factsheets/ispfact.html>.
95 See SBC Comments, supra note 8, at 4 (arguing that the
services supported under 254(h)(1)(A) and (h)(1)(B) are
limited to telecommunications services, thereby excluding
Internet service).
96 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2) (A) (Supp. 1997).
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to, "enhance, to the extent technically feasible
and economically reasonable, access to advanced
telecommunications and information services for all
public and non-profit elementary and secondary
school classrooms, health care providers and libraries." 97 ISPs fit comfortably into the definition

of information services because Internet access allows one to "generate, store, retrieve, and utilize
information via telecommunications. "' 98 But unlike subsection (h) (2) (B), this paragraph does
not stipulate any type of universal service mechanism through which access to advanced services
should be enhanced. 99 Nowhere in subsection
(h) (1) (A) is there any reference to support for
advanced services, contributions for such support,
or any sort of reimbursement process in return
for discounting those services.

100

Subsec-

tion(h) (2) (A) merely sets forth a rather ambiguous policy statement that access to advanced services should be enhanced in a competitively
neutral manner.10 1
4.

254(e)

To complicate matters just a tad more, Section
254(e) states, "only an eligible telecommunications
carriershall be eligible to receive specific Federal
universal service support."10 2 If only telecommunications carriers are eligible for universal service
support, and Internet service providers are not
telecommunications carriers, then could Con97

Id.

98 47 U.S.C. § 153 (20) (Supp. 1997).
99 47 U.S.C. § 254 (h)(2)(B) (Supp. 1997).

gress have intended that ISPs be supported by the
03
universal service fund?1

B.

The Universal Service Order

Congress left the onerous burden of implementing these provisions to a federal-state joint
board and the FCC.10

4

Not only did the joint-

board, and ultimately the Commission, have to interpret the legislative labyrinth that is Section 254,
it also had to devise a scheme by which the goals
of third generation universal service policy would
be realized within a competitive deregulatory context.'0 5 Based on the recommendations of a federal-state joint board, the Commission was to ensure that universal service contributions would be
made through explicit and predictable mechanisms and that those contributions would be equitable and non-discriminatory.1 0 6
In its UniversalService Order, the Commission established the $2.5 billion federal USF for the benefit of schools and libraries.1 0 7 It ordered all telecommunications carriers to make contributions to
the fund based on their gross revenues. 10 8 Only
carriers whose contributions would be de minimis
could be exempt from the contribution requirement.' 0 9 As for the beneficiaries of the newly established universal service fund, the Commission
concluded that the language of Section 254 authorized it to designate Internet access to schools
and libraries for universal service fund support.1 10
was given 15 months from the enactment of the 1996 Act in
which to decide upon the joint board's recommendations.

Id.

102

See id. at (h)(1)(A).
47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2) (A) (Supp. 1997)
47 U.S.C. § 214(e) (Supp. 1997).

105
Many commentators assert that such a task is theoretically impossible due to the inherent contradictions between
subsidization (which the USF necessitates) and deregulation

103

The legislative history seems to indicate an intent on

(which competition necessitates). See West, supra note 2,at
182-83.
106
See id.at (b)(4).
Universal Service Order,12 FCC Rcd., at 9002 para. 425.
107
108 See id. at 9171 para. 773. The contribution requirement isapproximately 4 percent of a telecommunications

100
101

the part of Congress to allow ISPs to benefit from universal
service. See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 12.
In referring to the provisions of subsection (h), the conference agreement stated, "They are intended, for example, to
provide the ability to browse library collections, review the

collections of museums, or find new information on the
treatment of an illness, to Americans everywhere via schools

and libraries. 142

CONG.

REc. H113 (daily ed. Jan. 31,

1996). The conference agreement is obviously speaking to
Internet access. Additionally, it states the Commission could,

carrier's gross revenues. See Consumer Information: The FCC's
Universal Support Mechanisms (visited Mar. 18, 1998)
<Fact Sheet: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common Carrier/Factsheets/univers.html>.
109 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (Supp.1997). "The Commis-

"determine that telecommunications and information services that constitute universal service for classrooms and libraries shall include . . . information services which can be
carried over the Internet." Id.
104
See 47 U.S.C. § 254(a) (1), (2) (Supp. 1997). The section requires the FCC to convene a Federal-State joint board
that would make recommendations to the Commission as to

sion may exempt a carrier or class of carriers from the requirement ifthe carrier's telecommunications activities are
limited to such an extent that the level of such carrier's con-

how Section 254 would be implemented. The Commission

and libraries would be able to receive USF support for all

tribution to the preservation and advancement of universal

service would be de minimis." Id.
110 See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 9002 para.
425. The Commission also concluded that eligible schools

Internet Service Providers and the Universal Service Fund

1998]

The Commission found that service providers
would be eligible for discounts for Internet access
whether or not the entity provided only Internet
access or offered Internet access as one of its service options.'1 1 The Commission limited contributors, on the other hand, to providers of telecom112
munications services.
V. THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE AOL CAMP
AND THE AT&T CAMP
A. The Sides
The Commission is in the midst of preparing a
Report to Congress on the implementation of
Section 254.113 It has requested comments from

interested parties regarding the overall universal
service scheme set forth in the UniversalService Order." 4 The comments demonstrate that two distinct factions exist, one for and the other against
the Commission's treatment of ISPs in the Universal Service Order.
For simplicity's sake, the supporters of the
Commission's Universal Service Order will be referred to herein as the AOL camp. 1 15 The oppo-

nents of the Universal Service Order, as it effects
ISPs, will be referred to herein as the AT&T
camp.

116

telecommunications services and internal connections provided by telecommunications carriers. See id.
111 See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 9086-87
para. 594 (finding that "Section 254(h) (2), in conjunction
with section 4(i), permits us to empower schools and libraries
to take the fullest advantage of competition to select the most

cost effective provider of Internet access and internal connection").
112 See id. at 9179-81 para. 788-89.
113

The Commission is required to conduct a thorough

reevaluation of who is required to contribute to universal service. The due date for the report is April 10, 1998. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Dkt. No. 9645, Fourth Order on Reconsideration,FCC 97-420, para. 255 (rel.

Dec. 30, 1997).

114 See Common CarrierBureau Seeks Comment for Report to
Congress on Universal Service Under the TelecommunicationsAct of
1996 (visited Mar. 18, 1998) <http//www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
CommonCarrier/PublicNotices/1998/da980002.html>.
115
The "AOL camp" includes: America Online, Inc.,
The Internet Service Provider Consortium ("ISP/C"), and
The Education and Library Networks Coalition ("EDLINC").
116
The "AT&T camp" includes AT&T Corp., Southern
Bell Communications, Inc., GTE Service Corp., and Airtouch
Communications, Inc. Neither the AT&T camp nor the AOL
camp constitute a complete list of players involved in the current controversy. They represent a select list of major players
on both sides of the issue. For a complete list of the interested parties in the Report to Congress on Universal Service,
see Comments: Report to Congress on Universal Service, CC Docket

B.

Statutory Arguments in Support of
Extending USF Support for Discounts on
Internet Access for Schools and Libraries:
The AOL Camp

Both the FCC and supporters of its decision on
Internet access for schools and libraries make detailed arguments in favor of the Commission's interpretation of Section 254.117 They base their
contentions on what they believe to be Congress'
intent and the discretion that should be given to
the FCC in interpreting that intent.1 18 Quite naturally, the ISPs who will be providing Internet access to schools and libraries are pleased with the
Commission's interpretation of Section 254.119
They undoubtedly look forward to taking a slice
of the $2.5 billion that will be raised, courtesy of
120
telecommunications carriers.
To reiterate, the FCC reasoned that Section 254
permitted it to extend USF support for Internet
access to schools and libraries. 12 1 According to
this interpretation, a provider of Internet access,
regardless of whether or not it is an ISP or a telecommunications carrier that provides basic services in addition to Internet services, will provide
Internet access to schools and libraries at discounted rates.1 22 The providers of Internet services will then be reimbursed through the USF, or
No. 96-45 (visited Mar. 16, 1998)

<dhttp//www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Comments/report2congress/rtccom.html>.
117 There has been extensive opportunity to comment
on the FCC'sJoint Board decision through the submission of
comments and reply comments by all interested parties. The
Commission has requested these comments in preparation of
its Report to Congress. The Report is due on April 10, 1998.
Federal-StateJoint Board on Universal Service, Fourth Order on

Reconsideration, CC Dkt. No. 96-45, para. 255 (rel. Dec. 30,

1997).
118 The legislative history indicated that Congress in-

tended to ensure that eligible schools and libraries have affordable access to modern telecommunications and information services that will enable them to provide educational
services to all parts of the nation. See Universal Service Order,

12 FCC Rcd. at 9002 para. 424; see also EDLIJNC Reply Comments, supra note 18, at 2; see also Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding in
part that a federal agency has broad discretion where legislative language is subject to interpretation).
119 See Conference Panelists Discuss Future of Subsidies, Regulation in Wake of Internet's Growth, TELECOMMUNICATION RE-

Mar. 16, 1998, 1998 WL 8485963.
See Mike Mills, FCC Approves Restructuring of Nation's
Telephone Rates; Consumers See Cuts of About 8 % on Long Distance Phone Bills, WASH. POST, May 8. 1997, at El.
121 See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 9008-09
para 436.
PORTS,
120

122

See id. at 9015 para. 449.
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have their mandatory contribution to the fund, in
the case of telecommunications/Internet providers, reduced accordingly. 12 3 Because an ISP is not
a telecommunications carrier, ISPs are exempt
from USF contributions. 12 4 The Commission
found such authority in sections 254(c) (3) and
254 (h) (2).125 The FCC reasoned that the language of Section 254(c) (3), giving it the authority
to "designate additional services for support," permitted it to designate non-telecommunications
126
services for support such as Internet access.
Proponents of this interpretation contend that if
Congress wanted to limit the range of possible
services only to telecommunications services, it
would have explicitly done, so by incorporating
the term, "additional telecommunications services"
instead of using the term, "additional services" in
Section 254(c) (3).127 They also cite to sections
254(h)(1)(B) 128 and 254(h)(2)(A),29 arguing

that the Commission could appropriately conclude that Congress intended for "advanced" and
"information" services to be subsidized by the

See id.
See id. at 9498 para. 283 (noting PacTel's concern
that allowing non-telecommunications carriers, such as ISPs,
to draw from the USF without making them contribute creates an unfair subsidy for enhanced service providers).
125
Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 9002 para. 425.
It is important to keep in mind that there is no statutory debate as to whether telecommunications service should be
supported by the USF. Congress was quite clear in its intent
to have telecommunications supported in Section
254(h) (1) (B). 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B); see also Universal
Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 9003 para. 425.
126
See id. at 9009, para. 437.
127
47 U.S.C. § 254(c) (3). "In addition to the services included under the definition of universal service under paragraph (1), the Commission may designate additional services
for such support mechanisms for schools, libraries, and rural
health care providers for the purpose of subsection (h)." Id.
See Comments of America Online, Inc., In re Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service (Report to Congress), CC
Dkt. No. 96-45, at 19 (Jan. 26, 1998) [hereinafter AOL Comments]. AOL further asserts that, "[I] n light of accompanying
legislative history, this interpretation makes sense. For example, Congress noted that the FCC could include 'dedicated
data links and the ability to gain access to educational materials, research information, statistics, information on government services, reports developed by Federal, State, and local
governments, and information services which can be carried
over the Internet." (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at
133, reprinted in 142 CONG. REc. H1113 (daily ed. Jan. 31,
1996)). AOL concludes that, "[G]iven this language, the inclusion of 'Internet access' among the supportable services is
entirely reasonable." See AOL Comments, supra note 14, at 19
n. 72.
128
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B):
(B) Educational Providers and Libraries. All telecommunications carriers serving a geographic area shall,
upon a bona fide request from for any of its services that
are within the definition of universal service under subsection (c) (3), provide such services to elementary

schools, secondary schools, and libraries for educational
purposes at rates less than the amounts charged for similar services to other parties... A telecommunications carrier providing service under this paragraph shall(i)have an amount equal to the discount treated as an
offset to its obligation to contribute to the mechanisms
to preserve and advance universal service, or
(ii)notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (e) of
this section, receive reimbursement utilizing the support
mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
Id.
129
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(2)(A):
(2)Advanced Services.-The Commission shall establish.
competitively neutral rules(A)to enhance, to the extent technically feasible and economically reasonable, access to advanced telecommunications and information services for all public and nonprofit elementary and secondary school classrooms,
health care providers, and libraries...
Id.
130
See AOL Comments, supra note 14, at 19.
131
See EDLINC Reply Comments, supra note 18, at 3. Section 4(i) empowers the Commission to make any rules, and
take any acts necessary, in order to carry out its mandates. See
47 U.S.C. § 4(i) (1994).
132
47 U.S.C. § 4(i) (1994).
133
See EDLINC Reply Comments, supra note 18 at 3; but see,
Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, 120 F 3d. 753 (8th Cir. 1997). In
Iowa, the Eighth Circuit rejected the FCC's generic authority
under 4(i) and 303(r) as authorization to promulgate intrastate pricing and contracting rules for interconnection agreements because this action went beyond the statutory language of sections 251 and 252 and conflicted with the
language of section 2(b) of the Act. The Eighth Circuit
found that, "these subsections merely supply the FCC with
ancillary authority to issue regulations that may be necessary
to fulfill its primary directives contained elsewhere in the statute. Neither subsection confers additional substantive authority on the FCC." Id. at 795. See also People of the State of
California v. FCC, 905 F. 2d 1217, 1240 n.35 ( 9 th Cir. 1990).

123

124

USF. 1 30

Proponents of the Universal Service Order also
claim that the Commission acted within its statutory authority under section 4(i).131

This is the

generic catch-all authority given to the Commission to "perform any and all acts, make such rules
and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions." 132 Consequently,
commenters such as EDLINC argue that even
though the language of Section 254 does not explicitly give the Commission authority to extend
USF discounts for Internet access, the FCC stayed
appropriately within its discretionary rulemaking
133
boundaries in doing so.
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C.

Arguments Against the FCC's Interpretation
of Section 254: The AT&T Camp

Telecommunications providers such as GTE,
SBC Communications and AT&T point out serious flaws in the FCC's decision to extend USF
support for Internet access. 134 They argue that

the FCC's new universal service scheme deviates
substantially from what Section 254 allows. 135 Understandably, providers of telecommunications
services do not look forward to subsidizing discounts given by ISPs with their USF contribu36
tions.1
While supporters of the FCC's decision cite to
the ambiguities of Section 254 and the Commission's ability to interpret those ambiguities as it
deems appropriate, 137 the statutory language
cited by the opponents of subsidized Internet access for schools and libraries is quite clear.'a3
For instance, critics point out that Section
254(e) states unequivocally that "only an eligible
telecommunications carrie?' may receive universal
service support.1

39

Considering that the FCC

does not currently view ISPs as telecommunications carriers, 140 it appears the Commission is ignoring, or at least stretching, the language of
254(e) by including ISPs as the beneficiaries of
14 1
the USF in its Universal Service Order.
Opponents also cite Sections 254(c)(1),(c)(3)
and (h), all of which refer to "telecommunications services."' 142 They argue that any reference
134
See SBC Comments, supra note 8, at 1 (arguing that
Congress did not intend for ISPs to receive federal universal
service support); see also AT&T Reply Comments, supra note 7,
at 9 (contending that ISPs should have to contribute to the
USF based on annual revenues); see also GTE Reply Comments,
supra note 8, at 19 (asserting that the FCC should devise a
system in which all telecommunications service providers are
treated consistently).
135
See GTE Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 19.
136
See SBC Comments, supra note 8, at 1. These discounts
also apply to inside wire services or internal connections. See
Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 9002 para. 425.
137
See EDIJNC Comments, supra note 18, at 2; see also
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 476 U.S. 837
(1984) (holding that a government agency can apply a reasonable interpretation to an ambiguous statute).
138
See SBC Comments, supra note 8, at 4 (citing Section
254(e) which limits universal service support to eligible telecommunications carriers).
139 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (Supp. 1997).
140
See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 9180 para.
789; see also Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 8
(stating that, "The Commission in the Universal Service Order
concludes that Internet access services are information services and not telecommunications services"). Id.; but see In re

to "advanced services" must be viewed in the section's proper context as an advanced telecommuni43
cations service, thus excluding Internet access.'
Accordingly, AT&T contends that "the expansive
interpretation of 'advanced services' to include
non-telecommunications services . . . simply can-

not be sustained by the plain meaning, intent, or
" 144
legislative history of [Section 254] .
Some of the most convincing evidence cited by
the AT&T camp in arguing that Congress did not
intend for Internet access to be supported by the
USF comes from Congress itself.1 4 5 In a letter to
Chairman Kennard, Senators Burns and Stevens
observe that "[I]f Internet conduit service is not a
telecommunications service, then that service can
never be supported as part of universal service
under the terms of Section 254."146 Indeed, the
Senators assert that they, "debated and decided in
Section 254 whether or not information services
would be directly supported by universal service,
and the answer was clearly not ... [t] he Commission cannot use its generic authority to trump the
147
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."

D.

Having Their Cake and Eating it Too:
Arguments in Support of the FCC's
Decision to Exempt ISPs from USF
Contributions
Of course, ISPs, such as AOL, who claim they

Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, CC Dkt. No. 96-45, FCC-98-67, at 4 (April 10, 1998). In
its report to Congress, the Commission came very close to
labeling one new Internet service as a telecommunications
service, namely, IP (Internet Protocol) telephony. See id. The
Commission, however, chose quite diplomatically to forego a
definitive pronouncement on the issue until a more complete record is made. See id.
141
See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 9002 para.
425.
142
See SBC Comments, supra note 8, at 3-4.
143
See id. This would also exclude other non-telecommunications services that the FCC designated for support
such as internal connections. See id.
144
See AT&T Reply Comments, supra note 7, at 10.
145
See.GTE Comments, supra note 8, at 21.
146
Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 9.
147
See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 14.
In speaking of the Commission's generic authority, the Senators are referring to section 4(i). "The Commission may perform any and all such acts, make such rules and regulations,
and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may
be necessary in the execution of its functions." 47 U.S.C.
§ 154(i),(Supp. 1997). ,
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should reap the benefits of the USF, are just as
quick to hail the FCC's decision to exempt ISPs
148
from having to make contributions to the fund.
They find support in Section 254(d) entitled,
"Telecommunications

1
Carrier Contribution.'

49

AOL aptly points out that the 1996 Act only appears to require universal service contributions
from telecommunications carriers.1 50 They reason, "[B]ecause Internet access services are not
telecommunications services, the FCC correctly
excluded them [ISPs] from its list of 'contributing
carriers' ."151
Alternatively, members of the AOL camp claim
that ISPs do actually contribute to the USF
through their purchases of necessary telecommunications services.1 5 2 They note the billions of
dollars they pay in telecommunications services
every year.' 53 They claim that with each purchase
of telecommunications services, such as business
lines, ISPs make an implicit, indirect contribution
to the USF. 15 4 AOL contends that if it were to

have to make explicit contributions, in addition to
having to buy telecommunications service for its
operations, the end result would be a discrimina55
tory double tax.'
E.

Competitive Neutrality: The AT&T Camp
Argues That ISPs Should Make Explicit
Contributions to the USF
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only fair for ISPs, who will be eligible for billions
of dollars in USF support under the FCC's plan,
to be required to contribute to the fund based on
their annual retail revenues. 15 6 They claim that
indirect USF support paid for by ISPs through the
purchase of telecommunications services is negligible compared to the contribution amount that
would result if ISPs had to pay-in based on retail
sales.' 57 The result is telecommunications carriers will pay more into the USF than they would
158
have to if ISPs contributed on the same basis.
Unfortunately for telecommunications carriers
disaffected by the FCC's scheme, they are unable
to overcome AOL camp's argument that Section
254(d) only requires telecommunications carriers
to contribute to universal service.1 59 The language of Section 254(d) is quite clear. 160 The
AT&T camp's fairness argument, however, is
rather strong, especially in light of the fact that
ISPs do compete, to some extent, with telecommunications carriers. 1 6' E-mail and Internet telephony are clear examples of such competition. 16 2 Forcing one group of market players to
subsidize another group of competing market
players undoubtedly violates the precepts of competitive neutrality, a concept upon which the Uni63
versal Service Order is supposedly based.1
In sum, the AOL camp's interpretation of Section 254 applauds the FCC's Universal Service Or-

Members of the AT&T camp contend that it is
See AOL Comments, supra note 14, at 21 (claiming that
148
the 1996 Act only requires telecommunications carriers to
contribute to the USF).
149
47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
150
See AOL Comments, supra note 14, at 21. "...[E]very
telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services shall contribute... to preserve and advance universal service." 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (Supp. 1997).
151
See AOL Comments, supra note 14, at 21 (citing Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 9179 para 788, 9181 para.
790).
See Reply Comments of America Online, Inc., In re
152
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service (Report to
Congress), CC Dkt. No. 96-45, at 6 (Feb. 6, 1998) [hereinafter AOL Reply Comments].
153
See id.
See id. at 7. The Commission agreed with this argu154
ment in its April 10 Report to Congress. See In re FederalState Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, CC
Dkt. 96-45, FCC 98-67, at 4 (April 10, 1998).
155 See id.
See AT&T Reply Comments, supra note 7, at 11.
156
157
See id. at 12. AT&T vehemently contends that an
ISP's purchase of interstate telecommunications services
does not constitute a contribution to the USF. Id. An ISP's

contribution to the USF would be much higher if that contribution was based on the ISP's retail revenues. Id. Because
ISPs are currently exempt from making such contributions,
Interexchange carriers, such as AT&T, are forced to make up
the difference. Id.
See id.
158
159
See generally SBC Comments, supra note 8.
See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (stating that only telecommu160
nications carriers shall contribute to universal service).
161 AT&T claims that Inter-exchange carriers ("IXCs")
are increasingly having to compete with ISPs in the areas
such as real-time fax and voice. See AT&T Comments at 11.
See also Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc., In re
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service (Report to
Congress), CC Dkt. No. 96-45, at 28-33 (Jan. 26, 1998) [hereinafter Airtouch Comments] ("The uneven treatment of ISPs
relative to other users of the public switched network will create additional problems as ISPs become increasingly competitive with carriers that are forced to pay universal service
taxes . . . ISPs will be competing against IXCs whose rates

reflect the fact that their services have to bear subsidy burdens"). See id.
162
See Nick Denton, Telephones on the Receiving End, FtNANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 14, 1998, at 26.
163
BellSouth makes the point quite succinctly: "Having
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der.164 They vigorously argue that Section 254
permits a scheme in which ISPs benefit from the
165
USF while not having to contribute to the USF.
In contrast, the crux of the AT&T camp's argument is that Section 254 does not allow ISPs to
take from the fund, but fairness dictates that ISPs
should contribute to the extent that they compete
with traditional telecommunications carriers. 166
As set forth below, both interpretations are wrong
VI.

THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE
INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 254

and adopts a much broader definition of the term
"telecommunications service."'1

70

A broad defini-

tion of telecommunications service that encompasses both traditional basic service and Internet
service appears to be supported by the language
of the 1996 Act. 17 1 The result of option 2 is more
in tune with Congress' intent when it enacted Section

254.172

A. Neither the AT&T Camp nor the AOL
Camp Can Have Their Way: Option 1

There are only two statutorily palatable interpretations of Section 254 as it relates to ISPs. The
logical outcome of either interpretation depends
entirely upon the regulatory definitions the FCC
chooses to apply. Under the first option, the
Commission can continue to distinguish between
telecommunications carriers, who are classified as
offering a telecommunications service and ISPs,
who are classified as offering an information service. 167 Option 1 produces a lukewarm result that
does little to further Congress' goal of bringing
168
advanced services to schools and libraries.
Under option 2, the current distinction between telecommunications carriers and ISPs is
dropped.169 It sheds the constraints of the FCC's
second generation basic/enhanced distinction

If the FCC continues to distinguish between
ISPs and telecommunications providers, neither
the AT&T camp nor the AOL camp interpretation

adopted competitive neutrality as a principle of universal service, the Commission under its Section 254 obligations
should create rules that operate in a competitively neutral
manner. To maintain rules that are not competitively neutral conflicts with Congress' admonition in Section 254 to
adopt universal service policies that reflect the principles
enumerated in the statute." See, e.g.,
Comments of Bell
South, In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service
(Report to Congress) CC Dkt. No. 96-45, at 9 (Jan. 1998)
[hereinafter BellSouth Comments].
164
See AOL Comments, supra note 14, at 18 (supporting
the FCC's universal service scheme as consistent with the
1996 Act).
165
See id. at 20-21.
166
See AT&T Reply Comments, supra note 7, at 13 (asserting that, "to the extent that a provider offers both telecommunications and information services, the telecommunications portion must be assessed USF support obligations").
167
See Universal Service Order 12 FCC Rcd., at 8822 para.
83; see also Computer II, 77 F.C.C. 2d, at 387 para 5.
168
See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (b)(6); see also 142 CO.NG. REC.
H1113 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996).
169 Senators Burns and Stevens advocate dropping the
telecommunications carrier/ISP distinction. See Burns and
Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 8.
170 This is precisely the type of broad definition that Senators Burns and Stevens recommend. See Burns and Stevens
Comments, supra note 20, at 5.

171
See id; The Senators point out that there would have
been no need to include the definition of 'telecommunications carrier' in the 1996 act if Congress merely intended
that definition to mirror the second generation of 'common
carrier' which was limited to the providers of basic services.
See id. at 5.
172
Otherwise, Congress's referrals to Internet access in
the Conference Agreement would have been entirely superfluous. See 142 CONG. REc. H1113 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996);
but see McCain: No Common Carrier Regulation for ISPs, Multimedia Daily, Mar. 17, 1998, 1998 WL 6568980 (arguing that
Congress never intended for ISPs to be brought under the
veil of common carrier regulation, which would be precisely
the case if ISPs were considered telecommunications carriers).
173
See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 14.
174
See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 9180 at
para. 789. The Commission reveals the telecommunications
carrier/ISP distinction by noting: "We observe that ISPs alter
the format of information through computer processing applications such as protocol conversion and interaction with
stored data, while the statutory definition of telecommunications only includes transmissions that do not alter the form or
content of the information sent" (emphasis added). Id.
175
See 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (Supp. 1997).
176
See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 9.
177
See 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1994).
178
See id. at (h)(2)(A).

of Section 254 can stand.1
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This, of course,

means that the Commission must revisit the decision it made in the Universal Service Order.
To date, ISPs are defined by the Commission as
providers of information services.' 7 4 Section
254(e) clearly states that only telecommunications
providers are eligible for USF support. 7 5 So long
as Internet access constitutes an information ser176
vice, ISPs cannot be supported by the USF.
Combining the Commission's generic authority
under section 4(i) 1 7 7 with the hazy policy goal
elicited in Section 254(h) (2) (a) 17 does not sufficiently justify overcoming the crystal clear man-
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date of Section 254(e).1 79 The FCC cannot simply

pile statutory ambiguity upon statutory ambiguity
until it achieves the desired result, especially in
the face of explicit statutory language.18 0
Similarly, because ISPs are classified as information service providers, they cannot be made to
contribute to the USF. 18 1 Like 254(e), the language of 254(d) is quite clear.18 2 Only "telecommunications carriers" are required to contribute
to the fund.1813 Even in light of the AT&T camp's
strong arguments regarding competitive neutrality, there is simply no way to bring an ISP, as currently defined, into the ambit of Section 254(d).
A realistic reading of Section 254 demonstrates
that, under the FCC's current regulatory framework, ISPs can neither take from, nor contribute
to, the USF. 18 4

Both the AOL camp and the

AT&T camp lose out.
B.

Dropping the Telecommunications Carrier/
ISP Distinction: Option 2 (A Third
Generation Interpretation)

Surely in light of the legislative history, option 1
is a bit sour.' 8 5 Why would Congress have even
bothered with including a section that discussed
advanced services for schools' 86 if language within
the very same section prohibited the formulation
18 7
of mechanisms to support those services?
There is yet another outcome that the language
of Section 254 can bear. This outcome, in fact, is
probably more in tune with Congress' intent in
enacting Section 254.188 It requires a revamping
179
See id. at (e).
180 See generally Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that courts review an
agency's construction of a statute with two questions in mind:
first, the court must ask whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise question at issue; second, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the issue at hand, the
court must determine whether the agency's interpretation is
based on a permissible construction of the statute).
181 See AOL Comments, supra note 14, at 21; see also Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 9180 para. 789.
182
See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d),(e).
183
Id. § 254(d).
184
See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 12.
Indeed, the Senators assert that, "[h]ad the Commission concluded, as we believe they should have, that Internet access is
a telecommunications service, then there would be no reason
for the Commission's strained interpretation of Section
254(h)(2)(A)." Id.
185
See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 12
(arguing that Congress intended for schools to receive subsidized Internet access tinder the fund); see also H.R. CONE.
REP. No 104-458 (1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. REc. H1112-
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of the FCC's outmode second generation terminology in a way that allows Internet access to constitute a telecommunications service and ISPs to
be considered telecommunications carriers. 18 9
There is support for a broader definition of
telecommunications carrier both in the Act and
in recent comments made by Senators Burns and
Stevens.1 90 "Telecommunications carrier" is a
19 1
third generation term added to the 1996 Act.
It was not meant to be limited to the FCC's second generation definition of "common carrier," a
192
provider primarily of basic telephone services.
As Senators Burns and Stevens point out:
If Congress had intended the term "telecommunications carrier" to mean "common carrier," there would
have been no need to add this new term. Congress,
though, did intend "telecommunications carrier" to define a class broader than the pre-Telecommunications
Act "common carrier" regime. That intent is evident
from the definition of a "telecommunications carrier"
added by the Telecommunications Act. l9 '

Applying third generation terminology, an ISP
can justifiably be considered a telecommunications carrier. 194 According to the 1996 Act, "telecommunication" means "the transmission between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choosing, without
change in the form or content of the information
as sent and received."' 195 Indeed, when one uses

their ISP to access a web page on the Internet or
to send an e-mail, information of the user's choosing is being transmitted among and between
points specified by the user. 9 6 Telecommunications have taken place. If Internet service consti13 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996).
186
See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6) (Supp. 1997).
187
See id. at (e).
188 See generally Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20.
189 See id. at 12.
190

See generally id.

191 The 1996 Act defines a "telecommunications carrier"
as ".. .any provider of telecommunications services." 47
U.S.C. § 153(44) (Supp. 1997). Accordingly, "telecommunications" means "the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing,
without change in the form or content of the information as
sent and received." 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. 1997).
192
See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 5; see
also Computer II, 77 F.C.C. 2d, at 387 para. 5.
193 See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 5.
194
Designating ISPs as telecommunications carriers may
also make ISPs susceptible to the payment of access charges.
These implication go beyond the scope of this paper.
195
47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. 1997).
196 Some protocol conversion does take place when a
message is transmitted between two computers in order to
enable the transmission. As technologies advance, this sort
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tutes a telecommunications service, then ISPs
19 7
must logically be telecommunications carriers.
Under a third generation application, ISPs fit
comfortably within the larger category of telecommunications carriers. In applying third generation terminology to Section 254, option 2 achieves
a far more amicable result than that of option 1.
Accordingly, it is necessary to reinterpret the statute using the new terms.
As newly defined telecommunications carriers,
ISPs could receive universal service support for
discounted Internet access. 198 The FCC would no
longer have to side step the language of 254(e)
which limits the beneficiaries of universal service
to telecommunications carriers. 199 However,
under 254(d), ISPs would also have to contribute
to the fund as regular telecommunications carriers.2 00 Having ISPs both benefit from, and contribute to, the USF will satisfy the 1996 Act's dual
goals of bringing advanced telecommunications
service to schools and libraries, and maintaining
competitive neutrality in a third generation regu20 1
latory context.

VII.

of conversion will also take place between two phone or two
fax machines. This type of conversion, as the Senators point
out, is not determinative of a provider's status. Thus, mere
peripheral protocol conversion should not lock a service into
the Act's definition of an information service. If this were to
be done consistently, all services would eventually be deemed
"information services" because all communications technologies will eventually incorporate some form of protocol conversion. See Burns and Stevens Comments, supra note 20, at 6.
197
See id. at 12.
198 As a telecommunications carrier, an ISP would come

(Supp. 1997).

under the guise of subsection (e). See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (e)

CONCLUSION

The current controversy over ISPs and the USF
is a result of the FCC's misapplication of second
generation regulatory terms to a statute that is
supposed to embody the third generation of universal service policy. The Commission cannot allow ISPs to have their cake and eat it too under
Section 254. No matter what interpretation the
FCC applies, the language of the statute does not
allow for ISPs to take from, but not contribute to,
the USF.
The FCC needs to re-evaluate its Universal Service Order. In doing so, it should do away with the
telecommunications carrier/ISP distinction and
embrace the broader definition of a telecommunications service that the Act requires. A third
generation statute should be interpreted using
third generation terminology. Otherwise, the
laudable new goals of third generation universal
service policy will be sacrificed.

199
200

See 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (Supp. 1997).
The subsection specifically states, "all telecommuni-

cations carriers." Id. § 254(e).
201
It should be noted, however, that reclassifying ISPs as
telecommunications carriers will only satisfy the dual goals of
competitive neutrality and subsidized Internet access within
the Commission's overall universal service plan. Whether
universal service itself is compatible with competitive neutrality and a deregulatory environment has yet to be demonstrated. See, e.g., West, supra note 2.

